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NRDC v. EPA: Interpretation of Section 112 of the 
Clean Air Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary generally gives great deference to interpretations of 
a statute by the administrative agency charged with its implementa-
tion.1 Consequently, the standard of review for an administrative 
agency's statutory interpretation is very narrow.2 If Congress has spe-
cifically addressed the issue, then that specific statutory language gov-
erns. If the language and intent of Congress are ambiguous, however, 
an administrative agency has great latitude in interpreting the statutory 
language, and thus, the court must give considerable weight to the 
agency's interpretation.3 In fact, the presumptive validity of an agency's 
actions may only be overcome if they are found to be: "(A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
[or] (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right."" 
In NRDC v. EPA/' the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") evaluated the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's ("EPA") interpretation of section 112(b)(1)(B)6 of the 
1. The deference given, however, "does not permit the court to become a rubber stamp, auto-
matically approving every agency interpretation of a statute. Rather, it requires 'a searching and 
careful' inquiry into the facts of each case to determine that the agency has acted within the scope 
of its statutory authority." Ohio v. Ruckelshaus, 776 F.2d 1333, 1339 (6th Cir. 1985). This means 
that an agency's action must be upheld unless it is unreasonable. ld. 
An interpretation is unreasonable unless it is a permissible interpretation based on substantial 
evidence as stated in the Administrative Procedure Act standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). Yaffe Iron 
& Metal Co. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1008, 1014 (lOth Cir. 1985). 
Substantial evidence is 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Moreover, the pos-
sibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not mean that 
they are not supported by substantial evidence. The agency's findings as to facts sup-
ported by substantial evidence must be accorded due deference and may not be set aside 
by the reviewing court. 
ld. (citation omitted). 
2. Ohio v. Ruckelshaus, 776 F.2d 1333, 1338 (6th Cir. 1985). 
3. /d. 
4. Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071, 1082-83 (6th Cir. 1984). 
5. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane). 
6. Section 112(b)(l)(B) provides in pertinent part: "The Administrator shall establish any 
such standard at the level which in his judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the 
public health from such hazardous air pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(l)(B) (1982). 
349 
350 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
Clean Air Act ("CAA'') as it applies to hazardous air pollutants. The 
suit by the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") challenged 
the EPA's interpretation of section 112(b)(1)(B) which allowed consid-
eration of technological and economic feasibility in setting emission 
standards for hazardous pollutants. The Court of Appeals held that 
technological and economic feasibility could not be considered in the 
initial determination of what was "safe."7 The court concluded, how-
ever, that consideration of feasibility was acceptable in setting final 
emission standards. 
This note examines NRDC v. EPA by focusing on the statutory 
language and intent of section 112 of the CAA, and shows that the 
EPA's interpretation of section 112(b)(1)(B) was in excess of statutory 
authority. As such, the D.C. Circuit, in NRDC v. EPA, gave undue 
deference to the EPA's interpretation of section 112. 
II. THE NRDC CASE 
The NRDC case concerned regulation of hazardous air pollutants 
under section 112 of the CAA, specifically the regulation of vinyl chlo-
rides.8 Vinyl chlorides are known carcinogens, and as such, they fall 
within the ambit of section 112 since they "may reasonably be antici-
pated to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious 
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness. "9 In 197 5 the EPA 
sought to establish a standard for vinyl chloride emissions based on sci-
entific data then available. Because of scientific uncertainty, it was im-
possible to ascertain a definite level below which no harm to humans 
would occur. 10 However, the EPA had strong evidence that any atmo-
spheric concentration would be unsafe to human health.11 
Based on its determination that any allowable concentration could 
be unsafe, the EPA was faced with two alternatives. First, the EPA 
7. The court defined something as "unsafe" if it "threatens humans with a significant risk of 
harm." NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1153. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
8. Section 112 defines hazardous air pollutants as "air pollutants to which no ambient air 
quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator cause ... , or 
contribute ... , to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in 
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(a)(1). Under section 112 the Administrator of the EPA ("Administrator") is required to 
establish an emission standard for such hazardous air pollutants. /d. at § 7412(b)(1)(B). This 
section provides: "The Administrator shall establish any such standard at the level which in his 
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air 
pollutant." /d. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1). 
10. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1148. 
11. Based on the best available scientific evidence, it had been determined that vinyl chlorides 
caused cancer at all levels of exposure. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1148. 
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could prohibit all emissions of vinyl chlorides. Second, the EPA could 
adopt a standard that would allow emissions at the lowest possible level 
achievable by use of the best available control technology. Since the first 
alternative would have required closure of the entire plastics industry,12 
in 197 6 the EPA opted for the second alternative and consequently 
promulgated final emission standards for vinyl chloride based solely on 
the level attainable by the best available control technology. 13 As a re-
sult, the Environmental Defense Fund ("EDF") filed suit against the 
EPA, alleging that the EPA had exceeded its regulatory authority by 
considering technological and economic feasibility. That suit was later 
settled before trial. 
As part of the settlement of the EDF suit, the EPA in 1977 pro-
posed new regulations which would have reduced emission levels to five 
parts per million ("ppm"), with a stated ultimate goal of zero emis-
sions.14 The EPA, however, never acted on the new proposals. In 1985 
the EPA withdrew the proposed regulations in violation of the settle-
ment agreement with the ED F and reinstituted the 197 6 standards 
based on the best available control technology. 111 The suit by the 
NRDC challenged the EPA's use of technological and economic feasi-
bility in setting a standard under section 112(b)(1)(B).16 
On first hearing, the panel decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held in favor of the EPA/7 and allowed consideration of tech-
nological and economic feasibility at all stages of the regulations pro-
mulgation. On rehearing, the en bane court held that the EPA must 
place primary emphasis on health in setting standards for hazardous 
pollutants under section 112(b)(1)(B). However, while holding that the 
EPA could consider only health in determining what was safe, the 
court did allow consideration of technological and economic feasibility 
in setting the emission levels.18 
12. /d. at 1147. 
13. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1149; 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (1976). 
14. 42 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1977). 
15. 40 C.F.R. § 61.63 (1987). 
1 6. The NRDC argued that the EPA must set a zero level of emissions when it cannot be 
determined that there is a level above zero which is safe. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1151-52. 
17. NRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C.Cir. 1986). 
18. While the court refused to accept the NRDC's interpretation of section 112 as precluding 
the consideration of technological and economic feasibility in promulgating standards, the court 
also refused to accept the EPA's argument that the Administrator could place significant emphasis 
on feasibility. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1163-66. The court rejected the argument that since the 1977 
amendments to the Clean Air Act were made with Congress' awareness of vinyl chloride regula-
tions already promulgated by consideration of feasibility factors, the passage of those amendments 
was a ratification of the use of technological and economic feasibility in setting standards. /d. at 
1160-63. On the contrary, the court stated that since the Administrator had substituted technologi-
cal feasibility for health as the primary consideration, he had not exercised reasonable discretion in 
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The court's analysis was flawed for the following reasons. First, 
the court failed to adequately consider the legislative history of the 
CAA generally. Second, the court failed to recognize that the legislative 
history of section 112 specifically indicates that consideration of feasi-
bility was precluded.19 Third, the court misinterpreted comparison of 
section 112(b)(1)(B) to other sections of the CAA,20 overlooking section 
promulgating the standards. I d. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the court found that the primary consideration of Con-
gress in enacting section 112 was the public health. As such, the court said, the Administrator is 
required to first determine what the standard should be for providing an ample margin of safety 
based on an initial determination of what is safe. /d. at 1164-66. The court stated: 
This determination must be based exclusively upon the Administrator's determination 
of the risk to health at a particular emission level. ... [T]he Administrator's decision 
does not require a finding that 'safe' means 'risk-free,' or a finding that the determina-
tion is free from uncertainty. Instead, we find only that the Administrator's decision 
must be based upon an expert judgment with regard to the level of emission that will 
result in an 'acceptable' risk to health. In this regard, the Administrator must deter-
mine what inferences should be drawn from available scientific data and decide what 
risks are acceptable in the world in which we live. This determination must be based 
solely upon the risk to health. The Administrator cannot under any circumstances con-
sider cost and technological feasibility at this stage of the analysis. The latter factors 
have no relevance to the preliminary determination of what is safe. Of course, if the 
Administrator cannot find that there is an acceptable risk at any level, then the Admin-
istrator must set the level at zero. 
Id. at 1164-65 (citations omitted). 
The court further stated that because of the technological uncertainty often involved in deter-
mining what is safe, "the Administrator should be free to diminish as much of the statistically 
determined risk as possible by setting the standard at the lowest feasible level." Id. at 1165. This, 
the court said, should be done only after a safe level of emissions has been determined by consider-
ation of health alone. /d. at 1165-66. Thus, the Administrator has substantial discretion to con-
sider feasibility during the later stages of emission standards promulgation. However, "[i]f the 
purpose of the statute is to protect health, discretion to overprotect does not logically imply discre-
tion to underprotect." Comment, The Trial of Hazardous Air Pollution Regulation, 16 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,066, 10,071 (1986). 
The court's decision has caused the EPA to reevaluate the standards previously promulgated 
and could cause some of these previous standards to be rewritten. Current Developments, ENVTL. 
L. REP. 1099 (Aug. 21, 1987). Since these previous standards were promulgated under the former 
policy of the EPA using consideration of feasibility as primary importance, they may be invalid in 
light of the current decision. ld. 
19. The final version of section 112 was a compromise provision of a joint Senate and House 
conference committee, and more closely resembled the Senate version. See infra notes 31-32 and 
accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit rejected the similarity between the final version of section 
112 and the Senate bill, dismissing it as inconsequential. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1153-54. In so 
doing, the court stated: 
I d. 
The final version of section 112 ... omits any reference to a prohibition of emissions 
and directs the Administrator to set an emissions standard 'at the level which in his 
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health.' Thus, Con-
gress rejected a provision which would have required the Administrator to prohibit 
certain emissions and adopted a provicion which places that decision within the Admin-
istrator's discretion. 
20. The court rejected the statutory interpretations of other sections of the CAA posed in 
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111 which specifically provides for consideration of technological and 
economic feasibility. 21 Fourth, the court overlooked specific subsections 
in section 112 which provide for consideration of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility under limited circumstances.22 Fifth, the court misin-
terpreted the language of section 112(b)(1)(B),23 especially with regard 
to the "margin of safety" language.24 In sum, the court failed to cor-
Union Elect. Co v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (stating that the Administrator cannot consider 
technological or economic feasibility under section 110(a)(2)), and Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 
F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that section 109(b)(l) prohibits the consideration of techno-
logical and economic feasibility), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980), as controlling this case. 
NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1157. In doing so the court stated that each of those cases considered whether 
the EPA must consider factors other than health factors, as contrasted in this case with the issue of 
whether the EPA may consider such factors. /d. at 1157. The court also said that in each of the 
two cited cases "there was some indication in the language, structure, or legislative history of the 
specific provision at issue that Congress intended to preclude consideration of cost and technologi-
cal feasibility .... [W]e find no such indication with respect to section 112." /d. at 1157. 
21. See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
23. The court stated that since the statutory language did not specifically limit the factors to 
be considered in section 112, the Administrator could "conceivably include all of the specific fac-
tors listed in other parts of the Act if necessary 'to protect the public health.' "NRDC, 824 F.2d at 
1158. The court also stated that even though Congress used the modifier "ample," intending that 
the agency set a standard great enough to assure that the public would not be exposed to "any-
thing resembling the maximum risk," Congress intended to allow the EPA a great deal of discre-
tion in setting standards. /d. at 1153. The court, in summarizing its position that the language of 
section 112 could not mean that zero emissions standards were mandated if health risks were 
speculative, emphasized that with carcinogens it is "unlikely that science will ever yield absolute 
certainty of safety in an area so complicated and rife with problems of measurement, modeling, 
long latency, and the like. [Accordingly], the Administrator would have no discretion but would be 
required to prohibit all emissions." /d. (emphasis in original). If such a result was intended by 
Congress, said the court, then it would have clearly indicated the same by use of explicit language. 
/d. 
24. In evaluating the "margin of safety" language, the court compared section 112 to section 
109. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1152-53. The court pointed to a Senate Report, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), dealing with section 109 which "explained the purpose of the 'margin 
of safety' standard as one of affording 'a reasonable degree of protection ... against hazards 
which research has not yet identified.'" NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1152 (emphasis in original). The 
court incorrectly interpreted the language in that report. (Also, the language cited by the court 
actually appeared under a discussion of section 110 rather than section 109 as the court had 
indicated.) See infra note 69 and accompanying text. The court stated that the statutory "margin 
of safety standard" was in accord with the historical use of that term in an engineering context 
where that term is used to allow for compensation in determinations based on uncertainties and 
variabilities. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1152 (quoting Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IowA L. REV. 609, 629 (1978)). 
Based upon such reasoning, the court stated that the Administrator had a great deal of discretion 
in promulgating emission standards. The court also pointed to Environmental Defense Fund v. 
EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir. 1978), a decision concerning interpretation of identical language in 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1152-53. The court said that in 
that case the language "margin of safety" was a directive to the Administrator to find a way to 
reconcile the seemingly paradoxical task of assuring the safety of the public's health when knowl-
edge of the facts necessary to make such a decision are unknown. /d. 
Additionally, the court said that the use of the word safety "is significant evidence that [Con-
354 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 2 
rectly evaluate congressional intent of section 112, thereby giving undue 
deference to the EPA's interpretation of that section. 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
A. Legislative History Of The Clean Air Act Generally 
Section 112 is a result of the 1970 Amendments to the Air Quality 
Control Act of 1967. These amendments as a whole are known as the 
CAA.25 The first step in analyzing the intent of Congress in enacting 
section 112 is to consider the overall intent of Congress in enacting 
these amendments. The D.C. Circuit, however, failed to adequately 
consider this. 
Congress did not enact the legislation in order to reach a reasona-
ble accomodation between air free of hazardous pollutants and eco-
nomic considerations; rather, the CAA was enacted in response to 
growing public concern with poor air quality and as a result of the 
failure of the Air Quality Act of 1967.26 
[T]he 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were a drastic remedy 
to what was perceived as a serious and otherwise uncheckable prob-
lem of air pollution ... and are expressly designed to force regulated 
sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time ap-
pear to be economically or technologically infeasible.27 
The Senate Report28 stated that the purpose of the bill was to 
restructure the methods available to attack a critical and growing na-
tional problem of air pollution. 
The legislation ... is the result of deep concern for protection of 
the health of the American people. Air pollution is not only an aes-
thetic nuisance. The Committee's concern with direct adverse effects 
upon public health has increased since the publication of air quality 
criteria documents for five major pollutants . . . . These documents 
indicate that the air pollution problem is more severe, more pervasive, 
and growing at a more rapid rate than was generally believed. . . . 
[N]ew information ... intensified the committee's concern to author-
gress] did not intend to require the Administrator to prohibit all emissions of non-threshold pollu-
tants." NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1153. In support of its position, the court pointed to a Supreme Court 
decision, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), 
which held that "'safe' does not mean 'risk-free'," but rather that "something is 'unsafe' only 
when it threatens humans with 'a significant risk of harm.'" NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1153. 
25. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983). 
26. !d. at 744. 
27. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976). 
28. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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ize a massive attack on air pollution. This bill is designed to provide 
the basis for such an attack.29 
355 
Thus, the general legislative history of the CAA shows that con-
gressional intent was to assert a "massive attack on air pollution" by 
forcing development of technology. This intent would best be met by a 
strict reading of the statutory language and legislative history of section 
112(b)(1)(B). 
B. Legislative History OJ Section 112 
The court failed to recognize that the legislative history of section 
112 indicates that consideration of technological and economic feasibil-
29. /d. at 1. The report further stated: 
Although the nature of the attack will differ from region to region, one objective will be 
the same: Air quality standards protective of the health of persons must be achieved 
within the 3-year period of the approval of plans to implement ambient air quality 
standards. The right of States to set more stringent standards of air quality has been 
preserved. Maintenance of existing high quality air is assured through provision for 
maximum control of new major pollution sources. 
The protection of public health-as required by the national ambient air quality 
standards and as mandated by provision for elimination of emissions of extremely haz-
ardous pollution agents-will require major action throughout the Nation. Many facili-
ties will require major investments in new technology and new processes. Some facili-
ties will need altered operating procedures or a change of fuels. Some facilities may be 
closed. 
The requirements for State action will be broadened. And the obligation on pol-
luters will be greatly increased. What has been a program focused on uniquely critical 
areas, underfunded and inadequately manned, will become truly national in scope and 
will require an immediate increase in personnel and funding. 
In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was expressed regarding the 
use of the concept of technical feasibility as the basis of ambient air standards. The 
Committee determined that 1) the health of people is more important than the question 
of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards protective of health 
is technically feasible; and, 2) the growth of pollution load in many areas, even with 
application of available technology, would still be deleterious to public health. 
Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants either 
should meet the standard of the law or be closed down, and in addition that new 
sources should be controlled to the maximum extent possible to prevent atmospheric 
emissions. 
The bill would provide other important tools to protect public health and to assure 
effective implementation of the purposes of the Act. By providing authority to prohibit 
the emission of pollutants which present a clear hazard to health, the bill shifts the 
burden of proof to the polluter to identify safe emission levels. 
The extent of Federal involvement in the development and maintenance of air 
pollution control programs would be broadened. The pace and degree of enforcement 
will be quickened. 
/d. at 2-3. 
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ity was precluded. 80 The Senate version of section 112 contained strin-
gent provisions which explicitly allowed only consideration of health in 
determining emissions levels of all pollution sources. 81 The House bill, 
on the other hand, contained provisions which explicitly allowed con-
sideration of technological and economic feasibility in setting emissions 
standards and governed only new pollution sources.82 
Contrary to the court's reasoning,88 the joint committee bill more 
closely resembles the Senate version than the House version. It does so 
in two distinct respects. First, section 112 governs regulation of all pol-
lution sources as opposed to only new pollution sources. Second, like 
the Senate version, section 112(b)(1)(B) contains no explicit language 
permitting consideration of technological and economic feasibility. This 
fact is emphasized by provision in sections 112(c) and 112(e) for spe-
cific exemptions in limited circumstances based on technological and 
economic feasibility. 84 If section 112(b)(1)(B) allowed consideration of 
technological and economic feasibility, sections 112(c) and 112(e) would 
be unnecessary. 811 
In sum, the similarity of the final version of section 112(b )( 1 )(B) 
to the Senate bill, which allowed only health considerations, shows that 
consideration of technological and economic feasibility was precluded 
except for the explicit exemptions provided in sections 112(c) and 
112(e). This is clearly indicated in the committee reports on the final 
verswn. 
For example, Senator Muskie stated during a Senate post-confer-
ence consideration of the final version of section 112: 
The standards must be set to provide an ample margin of safety to 
protect the public health. This could mean, effectively, that a plant 
could be required to close because of the absence of control tech-
niques. It could include emission standards which allow for no mea-
surable emissions. 38 
Additionally, a more telling exposition is found in the House Re-
port of the final version of section 11287 where Representative Staggers 
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
31. SeeS. 4358, 91st Cong., Zd Sess. §6(b), 116 CoNG. REc. 32,375 (1970). 
32. See H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §5(a), 116 CoNG. REc. 19,225-26 (1970). 
33. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
35. NRDC v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wright, J., dissenting). 
36. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, EXHIBIT 
1 TO STATEMENT OF SEN. MUSKIE, CoNGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF 
CoNGRESS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS 
oF 1970 133 (Comm. Print 1974). 
37. [Mr. Staggers speaking]. Mr. Speaker, I am gratified to bring to the House the 
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stated that the Administrator should "vigorously enforce [section 112] 
to the point of setting zero emission levels for these highly hazardous 
substances .... " 38 He further stated: 
We have allowed the excuse of expanding technology and production 
to over-ride the paramount interest of the average citizen in protecting 
the environment and the air we breathe. Now I hope the pendulum 
conference report on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. I am proud to say to the 
House that the conference report embodies clean air legislation which is stronger than 
the bills passed by either House. 
I say this because the conferees after numerous and arduous working sessions have 
worked out a bill which promises to give to the American people clean air to breathe 
within the shortest feasible time. 
The conferees have been guided by two principles: to do what is feasible and to do what 
is reasonable. 
The bill passed by the other body incorporated many provisions which had not been 
included in the bill as passed by the House. The House conferees scrutinized carefully 
each of these provisions and applied to them the test of reasonableness and feasibleness. 
On the basis of these two tests, many of these Senate provisions have been revised. The 
revisions, however, do not weaken those provisions. On the contrary, the revisions 
strengthen them because they make more likely that we shall achieve the desirable goals 
which these provisions were designed to achieve. 
The Administrator has been given wide discretion in dealing with the emissions of 
highly hazardous substances. [Sec. 112] I would hope that in this area the Administra-
tor will vigorously enforce the act to the point of setting zero emission levels for these 
highly hazardous substances, which should be listed and defined .... 
Mr. Speaker, our Nation has had a sad and frustrating history of weak-kneed inaction 
by those who have been charged with protecting the divine right of every citizen to 
breathe clean air. Not only have the laws been weak and shot through with loopholes, 
but the underfunded administration of legislation to combat air pollution has been inef-
fective. We have allowed the excuse of expanding technology and production to over-
ride the paramount interest of the average citizen in protecting the environment and 
the air we breathe. 
Now I hope the pendulum will swing dramatically and drastically in the opposite 
direction. The very survival of human life on earth depends on the ability to breathe. 
We are getting choked with air pollution. Now that this excellent piece of legislation 
has been passed, the challenge is clearly how well the act will be administered. At the 
highest level of Government, leadership is demanded in order to protect clean air. The 
President of the United States must insist that this act be administered forcefully, 
fearlessly, and where any benefit of the doubt exists it should be resolved in favor of 
clean air and against those who pollute the air. We can no longer afford the pussy-
footing, artful dogging, delays, end runs, and outright flouting of the intent of the legis-
lation which has characterized the history of air pollution control. I trust that the Presi-
dent and the Environmental Protection Agency will seize this challenge and thus 
protect the right of every citizen to breathe clean air. 
HousE CoNSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE CoNFERENCE CoMMITTEE, CoNGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93o CoNG., 2o SESS., I A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 Ill, 116 (Comm. Print 1974) (emphasis 
added; brackets in original). Thus there seems to be no disagreement between the Senate and 
House objectives and methods. 
38. /d. at 116. 
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will swing dramatically and drastically in the opposite direction ... . 
[T]he challenge is clearly how well the act will be administered ... . 
The President of the United States must insist that this act be admin-
istered forcefully, fearlessly, and where any benefit of the doubt exists 
it should be resolved in favor of clean air and against those who 
pollute the air. " 311 
The House Report demonstrates that even the House of Repre-
sentatives, which initially wanted to include feasibility considerations in 
section 112 generally, stated that the EPA should set "zero emission 
levels for ... highly hazardous substances .... "40 The combined re-
ports demonstrate that allowance for consideration of technological and 
economic feasibility is precluded under section 112(b)(1)(B). A compar-
ison of section 112 to other sections of the CAA strengthens this 
conclusion. 
C. Comparison Of Section 112 To Other Sections Of The CAA 
Comparison of section 112 to other sections of the CAA shows that 
section 112(b )( 1 )(B) does not allow consideration of technological and 
economic feasibility when promulgating emmission standards. Section 
109(b)(1),41 for example, requires the establishment of ambient air 
quality standards42 and allows the Administrator to use judgment in 
assuring an "adequate margin of safety."43 It does not, however, men-
tion consideration of technological or economic feasibility.•• In Lead 
Industries Association, Inc. v. EPA;t.r> the D.C. Circuit stated that sec-
39. ld. (emphasis added). 
40. Id. 
41. 42 u.s.c. § 7409(b)(l). 
42. Ambient is defined as "surrounding or encompassing." Ambient air quality standards are 
those designed to control the atmospheric concentrations of a pollutant. Emission standards, on the 
other hand, are intended to control the actual amount emitted from a specific source. 
43. Section 109(b)(l) provides in pertinent part: 
National primary ambient air quality standards, prescribed under subsection (a) of this 
section shall be ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which 
in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate 
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health. 
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
44. ld. 
45. 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1979). After examining the language and legislative history of 
section 109(b)(1), the court stated that technological and economic feasibility factors were not 
permitted to be considered. ld. at 1148-50. The court stated that 
when Congress directs an agency to consider only certain factors in reaching an admin-
istrative decision, the agency is not free to trespass beyond the bounds of its statutory 
authority by taking other factors into account. A policy choice such as this is one which 
only Congress, not the courts and not EPA, can make. Indeed, the debates on the Act 
indicate that Congress was quite conscious of this fact. 
Id. at 1150. 
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tion 109(b)(l) not only fails to require the consideration of technologi-
cal and economic feasibility, but it actually prohibits such a considera-
tion. "'6 Additionally, section 11 O(a)(2),·l7 which also concerns state 
ambient air quality standards, does not mention technological or eco-
nomic feasibility.'8 In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,"'9 the Supreme Court 
interpreted section 11 O(a)(2) as prohibiting the consideration of feasi-
bility by the Administrator in his decision-making process.60 
The foregoing interpretations can be applied by analogy to section 
112(b)(1)(B). Like sections 109 and 110, section 112(b)(1)(B) does not 
explicitly bar the consideration of technological and economic feasibility 
in the establishment of air standards. Nevertheless, since the language 
is nearly identical in all three sections, section 112(b)(1)(B) should be 
read to prohibit the consideration of technological and economic feasi-
bility in the same manner as sections 109 and 110. The intended result 
of all three sections was to protect the public health. There were never 
any counterbalancing considerations for technological or economic 
feasibility. 61 
Furthermore, section 112(b)(1)(B) is inherently more deserving of 
feasibility preclusion. Sections 109 and 110 deal with ambient air qual-
ity standards, whereas section 112 is concerned with "hazardous air 
pollutant emission controls." Thus, 
/d. 
[i]t makes no sense to allow the Administrator greater latitude in the 
establishment of standards for pollutants Congress explicitly recog-
nized as highly dangerous than he is allowed in the regulation of less 
dangerous pollutants. In fact, § 112's language directing the Adminis-
46. /d. at 1148-50. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2). 
48. Section 11 O(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
(2) The Administrator shall ... approve or disapprove [a] plan, or any portion thereof. 
The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he determines 
that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that-
(A) ... (i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality 
standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously as 
practicable but ... in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such 
plan ... and (ii) in the case of a plan implementing a national secondary ambient air 
quality standard, it specifies a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will 
be attained. 
49. 427 U.S. 246 (1976). The Court interpreted the legislative history of section 110(a)(2) to 
preclude consideration of technological and economic feasibility factors. The Court also stated that 
the "technology-forcing character" of the CAA was "designed to force regulated sources to develop 
pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologically infea-
sible." /d. at 258. In analyzing the language of section 110(a)(2), the Court then stated that the 
"technology-forcing" "approach is apparent on the face of § 110(a)(2)." /d. 
50. /d. at 257-58. 
51. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
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trator to establish regulations which "in his judgment provide an am-
ple margin of safety to protect the public health" appears on its face 
to be more strict than § 1 09's language "adequate margin of 
safety."52 
Indeed, " '[a]mple' is defined as 'abundant; plentiful; more than ade-
quate.' Clearly Congress intended that in dealing with toxic pollutants 
that pose a threat to human health, margins of safety should be gener-
ous to ensure protection of human health."63 
Further comparison shows that other sections of the CAA contain 
express provisions for consideration of technological and economic feasi-
bility. For example, section 111 explicitly states: 
a standard of performance shall reflect the degree of emission limita-
tion and the percentage reduction achievable through application of 
the best technological system of continuous emission reduction that 
(taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduc-
tion, any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately 
demonstrated. 64 
The Administrator, in implementing section 111, is therefore directed 
to base standards on technological and economic feasibility. Contrasted 
with this explicit directive of section 111, section 112(b )( 1 )(B) does not 
direct the Administrator to consider feasibility in setting standards for 
hazardous air pollutants and thus would seem to prohibit him from so 
doing. 
In sum, comparison of section 112(b )(1 )(B) to other sections of the 
CAA shows that similar sections prohibit consideration of technological 
and economic feasibility, and also points out that Congress explicitly 
provides for such considerations when it intended that result. In addi-
tion, specific provisions for consideration of technological and economic 
feasibility are found in three subsections of section 112. 
D. Specific Subsections Of Section 112 Provide For Consideration Of 
Technological And Economic Feasibility 
The intention that feasibility not be considered in section 
112(b)(1)(B) may be inferred from three subsections of section 112: 
112(c)(2),55 112(c)(1)(B)(ii)56 and 112(e)(1).57 These subsections pro-
52. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 731 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Environmental Defense Fund 
v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in original)). 
53. Hall, The Control of Toxic Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, 63 IowA L. REV. 609, 630 (1978) (emphasis added). 
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
55. Section 112(c)(2) provides: 
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vide for consideration of technological and economic feasibility only 
under specified circumstances. Subsection 112(c)(2) allows a two-year 
waiver of a hazardous pollutant standard by the President "if he finds 
that the technology to implement such standards is not available and 
the operation of such source is required for reasons of national secur-
ity."118 Subsection 112(c)(1)(B)(ii) allows a two-year waiver by the Ad-
ministrator in the case of an existing source "if he finds that such pe-
riod is necessary for the installation of controls . . . ."119 Finally, 
subsection 112(e)(1) allows the Administrator "to set work practice 
standards, which are stated in terms of how the polluting activity is 
conducted, not how much pollution enters the ambient air, if EPA 
[finds] emission standards impractical."60 
There would be little sense in setting forth exceptions in the sub-
(2) The President may exempt any stationary source from compliance with paragraph 
(1) for a period of not more than two years if he finds that the technology to implement 
such standards is not available and the operation of such source is required for reasons 
of national security. An exemption under this paragraph may be extended for one or 
more additional periods, each period not to exceed two years. The President shall make 
a report to Congress with respect to each exemption (or extension thereof) made under 
this paragraph. 
/d. at § 7412(c)(2). 
56. Section 112(c)(l)(B)(ii) provides in pertinent part: 
(B) no air pollutant ... may be emitted from any stationary source in violation of such 
standard, except that in the case of an existing source-
(ii) the Administrator may grant a waiver permitting such source a period of up to 
two years after the effective date of a standard to comply with the standard, if he finds 
that such period is necessary for the installation of controls and that steps will be taken 
during the period of the waiver to assure that the health of persons will be protected 
from imminent endangerment. 
/d. at § 7412(c)(l)(B)(ii). 
57. Section 112(e) provides: 
(1) For purposes of this section, if in the judgment of the Administrator, it is not feasi-
ble to prescribe or enforce an emission standard for control of a hazardous air pollutant 
or pollutants, he may instead promulgate a design, equipment, work practice. or opera-
tional standard, or combination thereof, which in his judgment is adequate to protect 
the public health from such pollutant or pollutants with an ample margin of safety, In 
the event the Administrator promulgates a design or equipment standard under this 
subsection, he shall include as part of such standard such requirements as will assure 
the proper operation and maintenance of any such element of design or equipment. 
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase "not feasible to prescribe or enforce 
an emission standard" means any situation in whcih the Administrator determines that 
(A) a hazardous pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a conveyance 
designed and constructed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that any requirement for, 
or use of, such a conveyance would be inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local 
law, or (B) the application of measurement methodology to a particular class of sources 
is not practicable due to technological or economic limitations. 
/d. at § 7412(e). 
58. /d. at § 7412(c)(2). 
59. Id. at § 7412(c)(l)(B)(ii). 
60. Comment, supra note 18, at 10,067. 
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sections previously discussed, allowing consideration of technological 
and economic feasibility, if section 112(b )( 1 )(B) allowed such consider-
ation. Additionally, subsection 112(e)(1) was enacted in 1977 as an 
amendment to section 112. If section 112(b)(1)(B) had been intended to 
allow consideration of feasibility in determining standards, the subse-
quent amendment (which limited consideration of feasibility to very 
specialized circumstances) would have been unnecessary.61 Further-
more, a close look at the language of section 112(b )( 1 )(B) shows that 
only health can be considered. 
E. The Language Of Section 112 
Contrary to the court's opinion,62 the language of section 
112(b)(1 )(B) explicitly provides only for consideration of health. Sec-
tion 112 (b)( 1 )(B) directs the Administrator to establish an emissions 
"standard at the level which in his judgment provides an ample margin 
of safety to protect the public health from [a] hazardous air pollu-
tant. "63 As stated in the dissenting opinion of the panel decision, "[ t ]he 
provision contains no language authorizing the Administrator to con-
sider technological and economic feasibility. On the contrary, the lan-
guage on its face clearly makes the Administrator's decision dependent 
only on health considerations."6 • Although ignored by the court, many 
scholars support this interpretation. 611 In fact, the D.C. Circuit itself 
stated in an earlier decision: "Recognizing that 'certain pollutants' re-
quired special treatment because of risk to health, Congress enacted 
section 112, dealing with hazardous pollutants, without provision for 
considerations of feasibility."66 Not only does the overall language of 
61. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 730-31 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
62. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B). 
64. NRDC, 804 F.2d at 728 (Wright, J., dissenting). 
65. For example, one scholar states that the language "an ample margin of safety to protect 
to public health" means "that health must be protected without regard to cost. Section 112(b) ... 
appears to make cost irrelevant." Currie, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS § 3.28 
(1984). Another scholar stated that"§ 112 appears to direct EPA to set a highly protective stan-
dard that eliminates possible serious risks without regard to cost." F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER 
& A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW & POLICY 511 (1984). Additionally, 
[ s ]ection 112 can be read to require EPA to impose draconian controls to completely 
eliminate the risks whenever EPA concludes that an air pollutant may be hazardous at 
any level of emission. For example, it is generally accepted that there is no threshold 
level of safe exposure to airborne carcinogens. Therefore, protection of the public with 
a margin of safety would seem to require cutting out all exposure by eliminating all 
emissions. 
Comment, supra note 18, at 10,068 & n.18. 
66. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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section 112(b)(l)(B) support this conclusion, but also the "margin of 
safety" language specifically points to such reasoning. 
The D.C. Circuit failed to recognize that "the term 'margin of 
safety'[as used in section 112(b)(1)(B)] was intended to provide protec-
tion 'against hazards which research has not yet identified.' "67 As used 
in the engineering context, "[t]he safety factor is meant to compensate 
for uncertainties and variabilities in design, materials, workmanship, 
and so forth; the greater the variability, the larger the factor of 
safety."68 Thus, the "margin of safety" standard was intended to pro-
tect against unknown dangers, not allow for them by consideration of 
technological and economic feasibility. 69 Allowing the Administrator 
discretion to consider technological and economic feasibility is contrary 
to the need for an "ample margin of safety." 
The court also failed to recognize that section 112 only addresses 
"unsafe" conditions,70 i.e. conditions which pose a "significant risk of 
harm" to humans.71 As defined in section 112, a hazardous air pollu-
tant is a pollutant which "causes, or contributes to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or 
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, ill-
ness."72 Because all levels of exposure to vinyl chlorides are thought to 
cause cancer, vinyl chlorides indeed threaten humans with a "signifi-
cant risk of harm" and are therefore "unsafe." Therefore, if an emis-
sion level above zero is set because it is technologically or economically 
67. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (emphasis 
added). See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
68. Hall, supra note 53, at 629 (emphasis added). 
69. The court also failed to correctly interpret a Senate report discussing the "margin of 
safety" language. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The language cited by the court 
in support of its proposition that the "margin of safety" language allowed the Administrator to set 
a more lax standard actually appeared under a discussion of section II 0 rather than section I 09 
(as the court had indicated in its discussion). The language therein indicated: 
This section would provide for publication and promulgation of national ambient air 
quality standards at a level which will protect the health of persons. In setting such air 
quality standards the Secretary should consider and incorporate not only the results of 
research summarized in air quality criteria documents, but also the need for margins of 
safety. Margins of safety are essential to any health-related environmental standards if 
a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against hazards which research has 
not yet identified. 
/d. at 9-10 (emphasis added). In other words, after the best scientific research is considered, a 
margin of safety should be factored in to provide additional protection. 
70. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
71. The court defined something as "unsafe" if it "threatens humans with a significant risk 
of harm." NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1153 (quoting Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American 
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980)). 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(l). 
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infeasible to set a level at zero, the standard is ipso facto "unsafe" and 
in contradiction to the statutory language of section 112(b)(1)(B). 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion limited the EPA's 
consideration of technological and economic feasibility in the initial 
stages of promulgating emission standards under section 112(b )( 1 )(B) 
of the Clean Air Act. The court, however, allowed consideration of fea-
sibility in setting the standard after an initial determination is made of 
what is "safe." This seems to create a paradoxical situation in that a 
determination of what is "safe" must first be made by relying solely on 
health considerations; however, once this is done, a standard which is 
"unsafe" may be promulgated because it is technologically and econom-
ically infeasible to institute the appropriate standard. 
Although the court recognized that congressional intent was ori-
ented toward public health, the court then abandoned that health direc-
tive in favor of feasibility. This is not only a departure from congres-
sional intent of section 112(b)(1)(B), but also overlooks the specific 
exemptions provided within the section which are designed to accomo-
date intolerable economic consequences. Thus, the court made a step in 
the right direction by limiting the EPA's authority to override congres-
sional intent but failed to go far enough. Under such an interpretation 
implementation of congressional intent becomes infeasible. 
Robert M. Trimble 
